In the early hours of June 18, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that the battle against “the terrorist Zionist regime” had begun.The Iranian military’s General Staff announced a shift from “deterrent” strikes to “punitive” operations — an escalation prompted by Israel’s ongoing offensive, launched on June 13, which officially targets Iran’s nuclear program but has already resulted in the elimination of key military commanders and the destruction of Iran’s air defense systems. Israel appears to be aiming for the collapse of the Iranian state, though it's unclear how long it can sustain such an effort on its own. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — the backbone of the clerical regime — has been weakened and discredited. Israeli intelligence networks have reportedly penetrated deep inside Iran’s state and military institutions, and Khamenei himself may no longer be receiving accurate reports on the situation. Still, the regime could seek to regain public support by deploying nationalist rhetoric and making political concessions. According to Antonio Giustozzi of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the future of the Islamic Republic hinges on Tehran’s ability to adapt to this new phase of war.
Although the stated aim of Israel’s attack on Iran is to destroy Tehran’s nuclear programme, its main initial success on June 12-13 was the decapitation of Iran’s military: both the Commander of the IRGC and the chief of staff of the Iranian army were killed, together with several other senior military commanders. The damage to Iran’s air defences was also so extensive that they might now be completely unserviceable, but this makes little actual difference, as those defences had already proven to be no match for the Israelis in Syria and during previous raids inside Iran. The big display of Israeli special forces’ skills and capabilities in neutralising Iran’s air defence batteries appears in fact more a piece of psychological warfare than a real military need. The Israeli special forces also played a key role in targeting the military elite of Iran. The rather decrepit Iranian air force was also largely wiped out — but again nobody expected it could put up any resistance against the Israelis in the first place.
Paradoxically, it is in targeting his stated main objective — the nuclear programme — that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has fallen shortest. Given that the key enrichment facilities of Fordow are beyond the reach of Israeli weapons, this is not surprising. But it does beg the question of what Israel’s strategy really is. Although Israel claims to have inflicted major damage on the strategic missile arsenal of Iran, the Iranians were nevertheless able on 14-15 June to launch several waves of long-range strikes against Israeli cities.
The big display of Israeli special forces’ skills and capabilities in neutralising Iran’s air defence batteries appears in fact more a piece of psychological warfare than a real military need.
It is possible that Netanyahu bet that he could convince U.S. president Donald Trump to join the war after Iran — as expected — retaliated with strikes against Israel’s civilian population. If so, he might have miscalculated, as Trump rejected the invitation to join the operation. It has also gradually become known that Netanyahu hopes to eliminate the risk represented by Iran’s nuclear programme and nuclear capabilities by causing the Islamic Republic to collapse altogether. Netanyahu first hinted on 15 June that “regime change” was a possibility, and he has since repeated this multiple times. At this point, Netanyahu’s best chance at achieving victory involves creating conditions that lead to the ayatollahs being replaced.
Why Iran missed the June 13 attack
How vulnerable is the Iranian regime to Israeli efforts to bring it down? It is clear that the Islamic Republic had a very bad start to the campaign, with the Israelis succeeding in repeating the decapitation strategy that they inflicted on Hezbollah last year. This is remarkable and the effort of the Iranian government to make excuses, claiming that Trump misled them into thinking an Israeli strike would not happen while the talks were ongoing, does not really hold water. According to sources within the regime, the evening before the attack many Iranian officials were nervous due to the fact that a “friendly country” — likely Russia — had warned them of the imminent Israeli strike. It is possible that the Netanyahu government might have tipped the Russians off in order to safeguard its relations with Moscow. But then why didn’t the Iranians take precautions? Given previous Israeli strikes against Iran and Hezbollah, it defies belief that Tehran might have expected the strike to focus exclusively on nuclear infrastructure.
It could be that the top leadership of the country, probably Supreme Leader Khamenei himself, might have decided to disregard that warning, but there were other signs of an incoming attack. These include the evacuation of U.S. embassies in the region, along with Trump’s own rhetoric. The IAEA’s statement on 11 June that Iran had refused the international watchdog access to the country’s nuclear sites and that Tehran was continuing to enrich uranium to 60% should also have advised caution to the Iranians. Instead, senior military leaders of Iran and some of its nuclear scientists were tracked and killed — some of them in their bedrooms.
Consequences of the strikes on Tehran
Iran International
That Khamenei might not have the pulse of the situation is not surprising. Alone at the top of the regime for 36 years, he has effectively been living in a bunker since 28 September 2024. He has mostly been relying on his advisers for information — including about the state of the armed forces, and the majority of his most trusted advisers are officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These are unlikely to have frankly acknowledged to the Supreme Leader that their air defence was not up to scratch and highly likely to have portrayed Iran’s readiness in optimistic terms. After all, had they provided a more realistic assessment, the ever-increasing commitment of resources to the IRGC would perhaps have been questioned.
Iran’s weak spots
The Israelis have clearly been astonishingly successful at infiltrating Iran with their special forces, despite the Iranians knowing that the Israelis were present on Iran’s territory since at least 2007. Such Israeli infiltration operations have been intensifying in 2024, most notably with the killing of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh. It is obvious that the Israelis have considerable human intelligence resources in Iran and very likely also enjoy significant cooperation from elements of the Iranian armed forces. After the previous strikes on Iranian territory, waves of arrests of alleged Israeli spies and collaborators took place, mainly targeting the Iranian army. The army (artesh) competes with the IRGC for resources and has suffered in recent years from a re-allocation that has favoured the IRGC. The army’s political loyalty is also in question: during the wave of anti-regime demonstrations of 2022-2023, many desertions took place within its ranks, and according to sources within the army itself, recruitment has collapsed. The status of the army has been weakened and it now plays second fiddle to the IRGC.
The Israelis, on the other hand, were emboldened by their successful strikes against Hezbollah last year, and also by their feeling that the Iranian regime was in a state of decay — as highlighted by their growing success at infiltrating it. And there was indeed a sense of disillusionment inside the regime that affected even the IRGC. It should be assumed that the Israelis also sought contact with Iranian opposition groups, probably initially to recruit informers. If indeed Netanyahu has the collapse of the Islamic Republic in mind, trying to mobilise the internal opposition would be a necessary component of any such plan.
The non-violent opposition is not really organised nationally, it is fragmented into many small groups, and it completely lacks a leadership, making mobilising it quite hard. Sources within the regime report that monarchist elements have become active, trying to organise demonstrations, but with little success. The internal security apparatus of the regime is still fully functional for now, but one should not discount the strength of Iranian nationalism, nor the size of whatever remains of the social base of the regime. Eyewitnesses reported attempts by opponents of the regime to call for demonstrations from the windows of their houses, only to be rebutted and reported to the police by pro-regime neighbours. Along Iran’s borders there are also armed opposition groups, chief among them Kurds in the west and Baluchis in the east. Indeed, from Iran’s eastern border, sources within the main Baluchi opposition group, Jaysh ul Adl, have been reporting for months that Israeli funds are flowing towards their organisation and that they are being told to get ready for a big offensive in the wake of an Israeli/American attack on the regime. Black market arms dealers in Pakistan confirm that purchases by Jaysh ul Adl increased dramatically earlier this year. Among the Baluchi minority as a whole the reactions have been more mixed, with leading religious figure Mawlavi Abdul Hamid, known for his criticism of the regime, coming out in public in support of the Islamic Republic.
Targeted Israeli military action could increase the relative strength of groups seeking to opposed the Iranian regime on the ground. After Iran launched ballistic missiles against Israel, Israeli counter-retaliation strikes have hit economic targets, in particular the oil industry. If the Israelis could inflict extensive damage on the economic and transport infrastructure, they could conceivably hope to undermine the regime’s ability to respond effectively to insurgents’ offensives and any outbreaks of mass protest.
Missiles launched from Iran fly over the sky of Hebron in the West Bank on June 18
The Islamic Republic nonetheless appears to be on somewhat stronger ground after it was able to hit Israeli territory. It is not clear what Iran’s reserves of ballistic missiles are (it claims to have 2,000 of them). After the initial massive waves of retaliation, the Iranians reduced the numbers fired, but this could just be meant to ensure they have means of retaliation lasting for the coming several weeks. It is also not clear for how long Israel can keep striking Iran at such a pace. With the initial surprise gone, targeting the Iranian armed forces is not going to be as easy as it was at the start of the campaign, and presumably the Iranians have made contingency plans for dealing with an extensive air campaign against them. It will take a very extensive campaign to cripple the ability of the armed forces to contain any form of active opposition, and it is not clear whether Israel can sustain the necessary pressure alone.
Threats to Israel
There remains the possibility of the Iranians developing a nuclear weapon, which Netanyahu alleges they were doing anyway — and that they were two months away from completion at the start of his attack. While a long air campaign against Iran would in all likelihood see Israel outrun Iran’s reserve of ballistic missiles, it should also see the Iranians enrich enough uranium for a few atomic bombs (provided that Netanyahu is right).
The other risk for Israel is that its decapitation strategy and the devastating air campaign might prompt the leadership of the Islamic Republic to mobilize popular support using a set of new policies, relying on Iranian nationalism for regaining legitimacy. The IRGC — the main supporter of the regime’s militarist approach — was clearly weakened and discredited by the first few days of the Israeli attack. Their reputation was already in question after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and their idea that the best form of deterrence for Iran involved supporting the Axis of Resistance has visibly failed . The IRGC is also seen as being the main beneficiary of the regime’s proactive power projection policy as well as of the sanctions regime that was implemented at least in part as a response to Tehran’s aggressive IRGC-driven foreign policy. Meanwhile, the rest of the country suffers.
The IRGC specialises in sanctions busting and smuggling, activities that allegedly have allowed them to accumulate considerable wealth. Supreme Leader Khamenei might appear unlikely to go against the IRGC, and he may even take such a bold move as advocating for a return to the roots of the revolution. However, Khamenei already tested such a path in 2024, when he encouraged reformist Massud Pezeshkian to run for president — and even let him win — after having for years done his best to marginalise and undermine reformist politicians. Sources within the regime suggested at that time that Khamenei was aware of the leadership’s growing isolation from Iranian society. This suggests that such bold options are not to be ruled entirely out.